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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relationship between the level of Japanese business managers' 
compensation and the quality of corporate governance, and whether weaker governance 
structures lead to poorer future performance. The conclusions of this paper are as follows. 
First, the level of Japanese business managers' compensation increases as the percentage of 
'old', 'bank' and 'gray' outside directors increases. Compensation also increases with board 
stockholding and block holding. This suggests weak monitoring by old, bank and gray outside 
directors and block holders. Second, our results show that firms with weaker governance 
structures have poorer performance. These results suggest the existence of an 
overcompensation problem with Japanese managers similarly to the US. 
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?. Introduction 
 
    In Japan, firms are regarded as being managed by all of the board members. Under 
Japanese commercial law all board members, including inside directors, have 
management responsibility. The Tokyo Stock Exchange (2004), for instance, states the 
following: The term "management" means the persons recognized by the company to 
have actually been involved in the management of the company, including 
representative directors and executive officers, which in turn include representative 
executives and executives. (p.12). On the other hand, in the US the role of board 
members is merely to elect and monitor the chief executive officer (CEO) who, in turn, 
has responsibility for day-to-day management. This is the main difference between 
Japanese and US commercial law. However, past empirical studies do not confirm 
whether the corporate governance of Japanese firms' management style is weak. The 
objective of this paper is to examine whether there is a relation between the level of 
business managers' compensation and the quality of corporate governance, and whether 
firms with weaker governance structures have poorer future performance. 
    Theoretical studies by Holmstrom (1979; 1982) analyze the management 
compensation problem using a principal–agent model. They show that the compensation 
of agents (managers) becomes pay-for-performance so as to maximize value for 
shareholders (principals) when ex post business performance represents the manager's 
level of effort. Ozerturk (2005) presents a theoretical model concerning the degree of 
manager (CEO) independence. His model proves that the board of directors will 
monitor the CEO less when it is less independent of the CEO. 
    Previous empirical papers in the US examine the relation between the level of 
compensation for boards of directors and firms' performances. Sloan (1993) concludes 
that CEO cash compensation is positively related to business profit. Joskow and Rose 
(1994) show that CEO compensation is related both to firms' profits and stock returns. 
Their paper reports that CEO compensation increases by 6.8% as business profit 
increases by 10%, and by 0.8% as stock returns increase by 10%. 
    There are several studies that examine the relation between the level of CEO 
compensation and the quality of corporate governance. Yermack (1996) provides 
evidence that business value and performance is a decreasing function of board size, 
suggesting that the board of directors monitors the CEO less as the number of directors 
on the board increases. Core et al. (1999) point out the possibility that the board of 
directors tends to be dependent on the CEO when the CEO influences the board of 
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directors. They indicate the possibility that monitoring proxies, such as the board of 
directors' characteristics and ownership structure, are significantly related to CEO 
compensation. They also prove that CEO compensation increases as the result of 
insufficient monitoring of the board of directors and ownership structure. In addition, 
their paper shows that firms with weaker governance structures often have poorer future 
performance. 
    A number of past empirical papers also compare US and Japanese CEOs in terms 
of compensation for performance. Kato and Rockel (1992), for example, regress CEO 
compensation against stock returns, the return on equity (ROE), and CEO 
characteristics. They find that Japanese CEOs' compensation is positively related to 
business size but is not significantly related to either ROE or CEO characteristics. 
Kaplan (1994) regresses Japanese CEO compensation against stock returns, the growth 
rate of sales, return on assets (ROA), and a loss dummy variable using Japanese CEO 
compensation data from 1980 to 1988. He finds that the loss dummy variable is 
significantly related to CEO compensation. Finally, Kato (1997) examines the 
relationship between six main bank keiretsu dummy variables and CEO compensation 
in Japan. As with previous work, Kato (1997) confirms that CEO compensation is 
positively related to business performance. However, these studies generally examine 
the relationship between the level of CEO compensation and each firm's profits. 
Accordingly, there is no consideration given to the relationship between the level of 
managers' compensation and the quality of corporate governance, and whether firms 
with weaker governance structures have poorer future performance. 
    The conclusion of this paper is that Japanese managers are overcompensated 
because they are weakly monitored. We find that Japanese managerial compensation 
increases as the percentage of old, bank and gray outside directors increases. We also 
find that Japanese managers' compensation is higher in firms with block holders. These 
relationships suggest that monitoring of the role of old, bank, and gray outside directors 
is weak, as is monitoring of board stockholding and block holders. In order to examine 
whether firms with weaker governance structures have poorer future performance, we 
regress the predicted component of compensation arising from the quality of firms' 
corporate governance, such as the board and ownership structure variables, against 
future business performance. The results show that the predicted component of 
compensation is negatively related to future business performance, and that Japanese 
managers have an overcompensation problem as in the US. 
    The remainder of this paper is organized into five sections. In Section II we 
estimate the managers' compensation equation and make two hypotheses concerning 
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Japanese managers' compensation. In Section III the sample is described and the 
variables are defined. Section IV describes and interprets the empirical results. A 
summary and conclusion is provided in Section V. 
 
?. Empirical Model 
 
    Previous studies of Japanese CEOs' compensation assume that principals are 
outside shareholders and the agent (or manager) is the CEO. Japanese commercial law 
determines that all of board members, excluding outside directors and auditors, have 
some responsibility for management. This paper assumes that principals are outside 
shareholders, and agents (or managers) comprise all board members, excluding outside 
directors and auditors. We then examine whether outside directors sufficiently monitor 
managers. 
    In Section II.1, we present the methodology to test whether there is a relationship 
between the level of managers' compensation and the quality of corporate governance. 
Variables are defined in Section II.2. In Section II.3, we test whether firms with weaker 
governance structures have poorer future performance. 
 
II.1 The determinants of managers' compensation 
 
    This paper examines whether there is a relation between the level of a Japanese 
business manager's compensation and the quality of the firm's corporate governance as 
in Core et al. (1999)1. 
    We regress Japanese business managers' compensation against monitoring proxy 
variables that represent board of director characteristics and ownership structure after 
controlling for variables that represent business performance. The Japanese business 
managers' compensation regression is represented in equation (1). 
 
)sticscharacteri (board  ?)eperformanc(β  ?oncompensati ititjit k
kj
δ+=     
ittiit dc)ownership(stock   ? εη ++++ l
l
               (1)2
                                                  
1 Previous studies of Japanese CEO compensation such as Kaplan (1994) and Kato (1997) examine 
whether CEO compensation is positively related to business profit, but do not investigate whether or 
not CEO compensation is well monitored. 
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ic  = industry effect (dummy variables),  = time effect td
     When we relate compensation to corporate governance, the null hypothesis means 
that the estimated coefficients of monitoring proxy variables are equal to zero 
( 0== lk ηδ ). Accordingly, we can check the significance of the null hypothesis using 
the following F-test. 
l)k,(  0:H1N
∀== lk ηδ  vs.  otherwise:H1A
 
II.2 The managers' compensation estimation   
 
    We analyze the effectiveness of board and shareholders' monitoring of managers' 
compensation. Compensation is determined by each firm's performance and monitoring 
proxy variables when the null hypothesis ( ) is rejected. The 
definitions of all independent variables are provided in Table 1. 
l)k,(  0:H1N
∀== lk ηδ
    We employ four economic variables as determinants. Positive signs are 
hypothesized for the two business performance proxy variables: the growth rate of sales 
and ROA. Xu (1997) argues that a profit and/or loss statement is necessary when salary 
is paid. Therefore, we adopt the loss/profit dummy variable to check whether salary is 
reduced when a loss is reported. Managerial compensation in a larger firm is thought to 
be higher. This is because larger business size needs higher management abilities. As a 
result, managers' compensation is used to control for the effect of business size, and the 
sign condition of business size is positive. 
    We also include six types of board characteristics: the percentage of busy outside 
directors, gray outside directors, old outside directors, bank directors, government 
directors and corporate directors. Table 1 presents the definition of the six variables. 
Each of the variables representing the lack of outside directors' independence toward 
managers has a positive relation with managerial compensation. 
    There is mixed evidence about the sign condition of busy outside directors. Core et 
al. (1999) point out the possibility that their monitoring role is weak. On the other hand, 
busy outside directors improve their monitoring ability by holding the additional posts 
as other firms' directors. As a result, the sign condition of the percentage of busy outside 
directors cannot be determined. Core et al. (1999) suggest that the monitoring of gray 
and old outside directors is also weak: the sign condition of their monitoring is positive. 
                                                                                                                                                  
2 Table 1 presents the definitions of all variables that represent performance, board characteristics, 
and stock ownership. 
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    There is mixed evidence about the sign condition of the percentage of bank 
directors. In Japan, it has been argued that commercial banks monitor the management 
of firms, and so bank directors play a role in monitoring firms. If this is the case, then 
managers' compensation may be reduced by bank directors. On the other hand, Morck 
and Nakamura (1999) point out that the restructuring of firms does not progress after 
directors from the banking sector have joined the firm. Therefore, we cannot decide the 
sign condition. 
    There is mixed evidence about the sign condition of government directors. In the 
first instance, they are thought to play the role of an outside director as in Aoki et al. 
(1994). If this is the case, then sign condition is negative. On the other hand, Kaplan and 
Minton (1994) insist that government directors do not play the role of an outside 
director. In other words, they assume that the monitoring of government directors is 
weak because retired government officials tend to be firms' directors3. According to the 
assumptions of Kaplan and Minton (1994), government directors take a similar role to 
that of gray outside directors, and the sign condition is positive. Accordingly, we cannot 
decide the sign condition. Corporate directors are appointed by firms that hold more 
than 20% of stocks and are the largest stockholders. These also play a monitoring role. 
Therefore, the sign condition is negative. 
    We adopt two stock ownership variables: percentage of board stock ownership and 
block holder dummy variable. The sign condition of board stock ownership is defined as 
positive because the proportion of voting rights the board represents in a stockholders' 
meeting is higher when stock ownership is higher. The sign condition of the block 
holder dummy variable is negative as in Core et al. (1999). They point out that the role 
of block holders' monitoring is effective. Accordingly, the sign condition is negative. 
 
II.3 The excess compensation hypothesis 
 
    We find that monitoring proxies are significantly related to managers' compensation 
when the null hypothesis (H1N) is rejected. There are two possibilities if the null 
hypothesis is rejected. One possibility is that managers' compensation is well monitored. 
The terms of the monitoring proxies are positively related to future business 
performance when Japanese managers' compensation is well monitored. In other words, 
there is no excess compensation. We call this hypothesis the efficient compensation 
hypothesis. 
    The other possibility is that managers' compensation is weakly monitored. The 
                                                  
3 This is known as a 'descent from heaven'. 
 5
terms of the monitoring proxies are negatively related to future business performance 
when Japanese managers' compensation is weakly monitored. In other words, the terms 
indicate excess compensation. We call this hypothesis the excess compensation 
hypothesis. 
    In order to identify these two possibilities, future business performance is 
regressed against the terms representing the monitoring proxies (predicted excess 
compensation). The interpretation of the excess compensation hypothesis is that the 
predicted excess compensation (PEC) corresponds to managers' overcompensation 
when PEC is negatively related to future business performance. PEC arises from the 
quality of firms' corporate governance such as the board and ownership structure 
variables. As in Core et al. (1999), we define the monitoring proxy terms 
(  ) as PEC. +)sticscharacteri (boardδ ? it
^
k
k
)ownership(stock   ? it
^
l
l
η
 
)ownership(stock   ?)sticscharacteri (boardδ ? it
^
it
^
k l
lk
itPEC η+=        (2)               
where the coefficients on the governance variables (   
 ) are estimated with estimation (1). 
+)sticscharacteri (boardδ ? it
^
k
k
)ownership(stock   ? it
^
l
l
η
    To identify whether PEC ( ) is positively or negatively related to future 
business performance, we regress future business performance ( ) on PEC 
( ). Using a single control variable to represent business performance, we estimate 
the following equation. 
itPEC
htiROA +,
itPEC
 
                            (3) ittiit2it1, ε+d+c+saleζ+PECζ=+htiROA
ic  = industry effect (dummy variables),  = time effect td
 
0:H 13N ≥ξ  vs. 0:H 13A <ξ  
 
    We test the sign condition of equation (3) PEC ( 1ξ ) to examine whether the 
predicted efficient compensation hypothesis is accepted or rejected. The null hypothesis 
represents a positive sign condition ( 0:H 13N ≥ξ ), and the alternative hypothesis 
represents a negative sign condition ( 0:H 13A <ξ ). The dependent variable is a profit 
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index of both ROA in the next fiscal year and the average ROA for the next five fiscal 
years. 
    The sign condition of PEC ( 1ξ ) is negative when managers are weakly monitored. 
Then, future ROA goes down when PEC goes up, and there are excess components in 
managers' compensation. Core et al. (1999) report that the sign condition of PEC ( 1ξ ) is 
negative, and conclude that US CEO compensation includes excess components. 
 
III. Data 
 
    We use data from the Nikkei NEEDS database along with hand-collected data. The 
Nikkei NEEDS data is from company annual reports, which contain a panel of cash 
compensation data in the financial statements and list of stock holders. Data on the 
board of director characteristics are collected from Yakuin Shiki Ho. Yakuin Shiki Ho 
defines 'outside' directors as those directors who have become directors in the last four 
years, and 'busy' outside directors as those who serve on two or more other boards. 
    We remove firms if there is any missing compensation data, no data in Yakuin Shiki 
Ho, and no change of their account day. The final sample consists of 2,610 observations 
over a five-year period (from 1991 to 1995) for 522 Japanese manufacturing firms 
publicly traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The firms are divided into fifteen 
manufacturing industry groups4. 
    We specify each manager's cash compensation as the sum of salary and bonus 
earned per director. There is no publicly available data on CEO and individual 
compensation in Japan. Only total compensation data, including all directors and all 
auditors, is available in the Nikkei NEEDS database. 
    We obtain the survey data of compensation characteristics for the board of 
directors from Yakuin no Hoshu, Shoyo, Nenshuu. These survey data are collected from 
86 firms publicly traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The compensation data 
collected cover the CEO (or president), Senmu (senior managing director), Joumu 
(managing director), Torisimariyaku (junior directors), and the full-time and part-time 
auditors. 
    We can calculate the average compensation of all board members, excluding 
outside junior directors, full-time auditors and part-time auditors, with the data from 
Yakuin Shiki Ho and Yakuin no Hoshu, Shoyo, Nenshuu. The average compensation of 
all board members excluding outside directors and auditors is used as the manager's 
                                                  
4 Japan’s Standard Industrial Classification divides manufacturing industry firms into 24 groups. 
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compensation proxy variables. The manner of calculating the average manager's 
compensation is explained in the Appendix. 
    Descriptive statistics of the variables in equation (1) are provided in Table 2. As 
compared with the data in Core et al. (1999), the level of ROA and the growth rate of 
sales are lower because of the bursting of the bubble economy in 1990. Our sample 
contains many firms whose statements of accounts indicate losses, with 11.7% of firms 
earning negative profits. The average size of assets is about 200 billion yen. The number 
of directors in our sample is about 12, and this is larger than in Core et al. (1999). The 
average percentage of board members' stock ownership is 2.2%, and lower than that in 
Core et al. (1999). The average percentage of bank stock ownership is 41%, and of 
firms' stock ownership is 26%. Table 3 represents the descriptive statistics of the 
variables in equation (3). The level of average ROA after one fiscal year and for five 
fiscal years is low. 
 
IV. Results 
 
    In this section, we estimate two equations and test two hypotheses. First, in Section 
IV.1 we estimate equation (1), and test whether there is a relation between the level of 
Japanese business manager's compensation and the quality of corporate governance. 
Second, in Section IV.2 equation (3) is estimated, and tests whether the excess 
compensation hypothesis is accepted or rejected. 
 
IV.1 The managers' compensation estimation 
 
    Table 4 reports the results of estimation of equation (1). As for board 
characteristics, estimated equation (i) includes five types of variables excluding the 
percentage of gray outside directors, and (ii) includes six types of variables including 
the percentage of gray outside directors. 
    We test the null hypothesis (H1N) using estimated equation (1) (i) and (ii). The null 
hypothesis is rejected with the governance test, and the result is common to both (i) and 
(ii). Therefore, we find that managers' compensation is significantly related to the 
quality of a firm's corporate governance. 
    Table 4 demonstrates that the level of managers' compensation is related to 
business performance. As for economic determinants, the estimated coefficients of the 
growth rate of sales, ROA, and size of assets are consistent with their sign conditions, 
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and are positively significant at the 1% level. Similarly, the estimated coefficient of the 
loss dummy variable is consistent with the sign condition, and is negatively significant 
at the 1% level5. 
    The estimated equations (i) and (ii) of board characteristics are interpreted as 
follows. The estimated coefficient of the percentage of busy outside directors is not 
consistent with the sign condition, but is not significantly negative. This result is 
different from Core et al. (1999), and we can interpret this as busy outside directors 
developing their monitoring ability while they hold the additional posts as other firms' 
directors. The estimated coefficient of the percentage of old and gray outside directors is 
consistent, but not significantly positive. This result is consistent with Core et al. (1999), 
and supports the notion that their monitoring role is weak. The estimated coefficient of 
the percentage of bank directors is not significant, but positive. This result also supports 
assessment of their monitoring role as weak. The estimated coefficient of the percentage 
of government directors is not significant, but negative. The estimated coefficient of the 
percentage of corporate directors is consistent with the sign condition. As for the 
estimated equation (i), the estimated coefficient is not significant. It is, however, 
significant at the 10% level in equation (ii). This implies that corporate directors 
monitor their parent company, and that managers' compensation falls with their 
monitoring. 
    As for stock ownership, the percentage of stock ownership per board member and 
block holder dummy is positive at the 1% level. The estimated coefficient of percentage 
stock ownership per board member satisfies the sign condition. This is a different result 
to that of Core et al. (1999)6. 
 
IV.2 Predicted excess compensation hypothesis 
 
    In this section, we examine whether the terms of monitoring proxies are positively 
related to future business performance or negatively related. We can deduce that 
managers receive overcompensation when the terms of monitoring proxies are 
                                                  
5 We find that managers' compensation goes up by about 17 thousand yen as the growth rate of sales 
increases by 1%, and compensation goes up by about 300 thousand yen as ROA increases by 1%. 
We also find that managers' compensation goes down by about 1.3 million yen when the previous 
year's statement of accounts reports a negative profit. 
 
6In both (i) and (ii), managers' compensation increases by about 140 thousand yen as the percentage 
of stock ownership per board member increases by 1% or when ROA increases by 0.5%. Managerial 
compensation in companies where block holders exist is about 900 thousand yen lower than in those 
companies where block holders do not exist. 
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negatively related to future business performance. 
    Table 5 presents the results of equation (3). Equation (3), (i) and (ii), shows that the 
coefficient of PEC ( 1ξ ) is negative both for next year's ROA and the average ROA for 
the next five years, but these values are not significant. The result shows that the 
negative sign of the PEC coefficient is robust, and the effect of PEC in reducing 
business profits persists for long periods. The effect of PEC decreases and this is 
consistent with Core et al. (1999). We find that ROA decreases by about 0.1% as PEC 
increases by one unit year7, and, from(3) (i), that a cumulative loss in ROA decreases by 
–0.09% over one year and by –0.3% over five years, and from (3) (ii) that it decreases 
by –0.012% over one year and by –0.45% over five years. This effect is smaller than 
that found in Core et al. (1999). Compared with US managers' overcompensation, 
managers' compensation in Japan is relatively smaller. 
    Overall, the effect of PEC implies negative business performance. These results 
show that there is a manager overcompensation problem in Japan as in the US, but it is 
relatively smaller in the case of the former. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
    This paper examines whether managers' compensation is efficiently determined or 
overcompensated because of weak monitoring. As a result, there are three findings 
about Japanese managers' compensation. First, Japanese managers' compensation is 
related to the corporate governance of firms. Second, the monitoring role of old, bank, 
and gray outside directors is weak. The role of board members and block holders as 
stock holders is also weak. Third, the effect of PEC is negative to firms' performance, 
but the efficient compensation hypothesis is not significantly rejected. That is to say, 
there is a managers' overcompensation problem as in the US. In addition, we also find 
that the effect of PEC in decreasing firms' profits persists for five years. 
    The result of this paper implies that firms in Japan can get more profit by 
decreasing managers' overcompensation. In other words, Japanese firms can make more 
profit by decreasing the number of outside directors such as the old, the gray, and those 
from the banking sector. 
 
                                                  
7 The coefficient implies a per-year loss in ROA of 0.09%, 0.06%, 0.12%, and 0.09%, over one year 
by (3) (i), five years by (3) (i), one year by (3) (ii), and five years by (3) (ii). 
 10
Appendix 
    This appendix discusses the way in which the average compensation of all board 
members excluding outside directors and auditors is used as managers' compensation 
proxy variables. We divide all 86 firms in the sample into three groups to control for the 
size effect of board members' total compensation. These groups comprise small (28 
firms), medium (29 firms), and large (29 firms) compensation groups. The data 
comprise compensation for CEOs (or presidents), Senmu (senior managing directors), 
Joumu (managing directors), Torisimariyaku (junior directors), full-time auditors and 
part-time auditors. 
Example1: An example of average compensation data in Yakuin no Hoshu, Shoyo, 
Nenshuu 
CEO Senmu Joumu Torisimariyaku 
from inside 
Torisimariyaku 
from outside 
full-time 
auditors 
part-time 
auditors 
  A   B   C       D      E   F    G 
 
Characteristics data of the boards of directors are composed of the number of CEOs, 
Senmu, Joumu, Torisimariyaku from inside, Torisimariyaku from outside, full-time 
auditors, and part-time auditors. The number in each firm is as follows. 
 
Example2: An example of number data in Yakuin Shiki Ho 
CEO Senmu Joumu Torisimariyaku 
from inside 
Torisimariyaku 
from outside 
full-time 
auditors 
part-time 
auditors 
 a  b  c        d         E f   g 
 
    We calculate the average compensation of all board members excluding outside 
directors and auditors as follows. First, we calculate the average compensation of 
Torisimariyaku from outside (e * E), full-time auditors (f * F), and part-time auditors 
(g * G) in each of the three groups. Second, we calculate the total average compensation 
of Torisimariyaku from outside, full-time auditors, and part-time auditors 
(e * E + f * F + g * G) in each of the three groups. Third, we calculate the total average 
compensation of all board members excluding Torisimariyaku from outside, full-time 
auditors, and part-time auditors as follows. 
 
onCompensati sManager'
managers ofnumber 
G)) * g  F* f  E* (e oncompensati (Total ++−=  
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Table 1 Definitions of variables 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables  
Compensation per manager 
(Ten Thousands of Yen) 
Average estimated compensation of all board 
members, excluding outside directors and auditors 
Performance 
(Economic Determinants) 
 
The growth rate of sales (%) Previous year's growth rate of sale 
Return on assets (ROA) (%) ROA divided by the profit of the previous year 
Loss/profit dummy The dummy variable for negative pretax income 
log (Size of assets) Log-transfer size of asset 
Board Characteristics  
Busy outside directors 
(% of outside directors) 
The percentage of outside directors who serve on two 
or more other corporate boards 
Old outside directors 
(% of outside directors) 
The percentage of outside directors who are 65 years 
of age or older 
Gray outside directors 
(% of outside directors) 
The percentage of the outside directors who are less 
independent  
Bank directors 
(% of outside directors) 
The percentage of outside directors who are from 
commercial banks 
Government directors 
(% of outside directors) 
The percentage of directors who are appointed by the 
government 
Corporate directors 
(% of outside directors) 
The percentage of outside directors who are from 
firms holding more than 20% of stocks and that are 
the largest stockholders 
Stock Ownership  
Board stock ownership (%) The percentage of shareholdings owned by the board 
Block holder dummy The existence of an external party that owns at least 
10% of outstanding shares. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev 
Dependent Variables    
Compensation per manager 1435.588  1337.007  621.113  
Performance    
The growth rate of sales 1.483  0.288  19.375  
Return on assets (ROA) 1.600  1.580  2.886  
Loss/profit dummy 0.117 0.000 0.322 
Size of assets  19.821 8.048 39.050 
Board Characteristics    
Busy outside directors  31.395  0.000 37.945  
Old outside directors  12.553  0.000 26.737 
Gray outside directors  32.324  0.000 38.561  
Bank directors  21.075  0.000 32.042  
Government directors  4.374  0.000 16.805  
Corporate directors  14.844  0.000 31.562  
Stock Ownership    
Board stock ownership  2.142  0.398  4.114  
Block holder dummy 0.364  0.000 0.481  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics (2) 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev 
Dependent Variables    
ROA over one year (?? 1.193  1.284  3.037  
Average ROA over five years 
(?? 
1.128  1.171  2.404  
Independent Variables    
PEC by Eq(1) (i) (Millions Yen) 0.520 0.340 0.668 
PEC by Eq(1) (ii) (Millions Yen) 0.639 0.456  0.679  
Sales (Tens of Billions of Yen) 18.309  7.138  39.141  
 
 15
Table 4 Estimated coefficients for equation (1) 
Independent Variables Predicted 
Sign 
Regression(i) Regression(ii) 
Performance    
Growth rate of sales  + 1.697 ***
(0.006) 
1.686 ***
(0.007) 
Return on assets (ROA)  + 29.761 ***
(0.000) 
29.950 ***
(0.000) 
Loss/profit dummy – –128.048***
(0.005) 
–127.271 ***
(0.005) 
log (Size of assets) + 106.805***
(0.000) 
108.488 ***
(0.000) 
Board Characteristics    
Busy outside directors  + –0.170 
(0.605) 
–0.257 
(0.457) 
Old outside directors  + 0.651 
(0.143) 
0.635 
(0.154) 
Gray outside directors  +  0.288 
(0.411) 
Bank directors  ? 0.185 
(0.618) 
0.286 
(0.464) 
Government directors  ? –1.027 
(0.139) 
–0.911 
(0.198) 
Corporate directors  – –0.826 * 
(0.075) 
–0.700 
(0.152) 
Stock Ownership    
Board stock ownership + 13.943 ***
(0.000) 
13.855 ***
(0.000) 
Block holder dummy – 88.519 ***
(0.004) 
91.520 ***
(0.003) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.8827 0.8827 
F-statistic  655.73 *** 634.52 ***
Pooled test (F-statistic)  4.21 *** 4.25 ***
Governance test (F-statistic)  4.83 *** 4.31 ***
Note.  P-values are in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The null hypothesis of the pooled test is that all 
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of industrial dummy variables equal zero. 
 
 
Table 5 Estimated coefficients for equation (3) 
Independent Variables (i) 1 year (i) 5 years (ii) 1 year (ii) 5 years 
PEC –0.09 
(0.295) 
–0.06 
(0.387) 
–0.12 
(0.166) 
–0.09 
(0.183) 
Size of sales –0.0002 
(0.893) 
0.0004 
(0.777) 
–0.0003 
(0.832) 
0.0002 
(0.854) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.168 0.213 0.168 0.2137 
F-statistic 26.08 *** 34.71 *** 26.13 *** 34.77 ***
Pooled test (F value) 6.91 *** 8.34 *** 6.92 *** 8.36 ***
Note.  P-values are in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The null hypothesis of the pooled test is that all 
industrial dummy variables equal zero. 
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